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THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
A Critical Evaluation
Makau Mutua*
I.

Introduction

The regional African human rights system is based on the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African or Banjul
Charter),1 which entered into force on October 21, 1986, upon
ratification by a simple majority of member states of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU).2
In June 1998, the OAU
adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights.3 The African Human Rights Court is intended to
complement4 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
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1

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
59 (1982).
2

The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the 18th Assembly
of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, the official body of
African states. It is also known as the Banjul Charter because a
final draft of it was produced in Banjul, the capital of the
Gambia.
3

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
Organization of African Unity, Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, June
1998, OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.(1) Rev.2. [hereinafter Protocol].
See also “African Foreign Ministers Discuss Human Rights,”
Africa News, April 15, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
4

The Protocol shall enter into force thirty days after
ratification by fifteen OAU member states. Protocol, supra note
3, article 34. Although by April 1999 the Protocol had been
signed by 30 states, only two, Burkina Faso and Senegal, had
ratified it. See “African Human Rights Commission Session
Opens,” Africa News, April 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
1

the body that has exercised continental oversight over human rights
since 1987.5 The Protocol suggests that the African Human Rights
Court will make the promotion and the protection of human rights
within the regional system more effective.6 But the mere addition
of a court, although a significant development, is unlikely by
itself to address sufficiently the normative and structural
weaknesses that have plagued the African human rights system since
its inception.
The modern African state is in many respects the colonial in
a different guise. The African state has been such an egregious
human rights violator that skepticism about its ability to create
an effective regional human rights system is appropriate.7
Library, CURNWS File. The Protocol states in the preamble that
the African Human Rights Court shall "complement and reinforce
the functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights." See preamble, Protocol, supra note 3. Elsewhere, the
Protocol clarifies and emphasizes that the African Human Rights
Court shall "complement the protective mandate of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights." Id., article 2. See
also Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos Magliveras, “Reinforcing the
African System of Human Rights: The Protocol for the
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights,”
16 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 431 (1998); U. Oji Umozurike, “The African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 92-3 (1997).
5

Until the Protocol comes into force and a Human Rights
Court is established, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights [hereafter African Commission] will remain the
sole supervisory organ for the implementation of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
6

See generally preamble, Protocol, supra note 3.

7

For discussions and analyses of the colonial imprint on the
African post-colonial state, see Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and
Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism
(1996); Crawford Young, "The Heritage of Colonialism," in Africa
in World Politics 19 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothschild, eds.,
1991); Robert H. Jackson, "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan
Africa," 46 J. Int'l Aff. 1 (1992); Ali A. Mazrui, "The African
State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse and Human
Displacement," Int'l J. Refugee L., Special Issue, July 1995, at
21; Makau wa Mutua, "Why Redraw the Map of Africa: a Moral and
Legal Inquiry," 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1113 (1995). Discussing
Africa's colonial legacy, one author notes that the "[m]ost
obvious and powerful expressions of the continued African
conceptual reliance on European political forms are the African
2

Although the Banjul Charter makes a significant contribution to the
human rights corpus, it creates an ineffectual enforcement system.
Its most notable contributions are the codification of the three
"generations" of rights, including the innovative concept of
peoples' rights, and the imposition of duties on individuals.8 But
many commentators have focused on the weaknesses in the African
system.
These include the "clawback" clauses in the African
Charter, the potential abuse of the language of duties, and the
absence of an effective protection mandate for the African
Commission.9
Recent changes in the African state, particularly those
related to demands for more open political societies, may augur
well for the protection of civil and political rights.10 Emergent
democracies such as Namibia, Malawi, Benin, South Africa, Tanzania,
and Mali are more inclined than their predecessors to respect human
rights at home, and to agree to a more viable regional system. In
this context, the African Human Rights Court is likely to operate
states themselves. The states are direct and uncritical
successors of the colonies." See Art Hansen, "African Refugees:
Defining and Defending Human Rights," in Human Rights and
Governance in Africa 139, 161 (Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden, &
Winston Nagan, eds., 1993).
8

On duties on the individual, see arts. 27-29, African
Charter, supra note 1. For a discussion of the concept of duties
in human rights discourse and the African Charter, see Makau wa
Mutua, "The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint:
an Evaluation of the Language of Duties," 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 339
(1995).
9

For discussions of these problems, see Richard Gittleman,
"The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: a Legal
Analysis," 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 667 (1982); Richard Gittleman, "The
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and
Procedures," in Guide to International Human Rights Practice 153
(Hurst Hannum, ed., 1984); Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, "The
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," in Guide to
International Human Rights Practice 159 (Hurst Hannum, ed.,
1992).
10

See Makau wa Mutua, "African Renaissance," New York Times,
May 11, 1991 (describing the demands by Africans for political
democracy); Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report
1993 (1992), at 6-9 (reporting Africa's political upheavals,
including those related to demands for political reforms and
democracy).
3

in a less hostile or cynical environment, the climate that
determined and sharply limited the powers and effectiveness of the
African Commission. In addition, the 1994 Rwandese genocide and
the recent atrocities in Nigeria, Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia,
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo have further illuminated the need
for stronger domestic and regional guarantees for human rights. In
fact, at no time in recent African history have the conditions for
the creation of an effective regional human rights system been more
favorable.
This paper critically evaluates the African human rights
system and assesses its potential impact on human rights conditions
on the continent.
It examines the normative aspects and
institutional arrangements created under the African Charter and
the Protocol for the African Human Rights Court. It asks whether
a clear and mutually reinforcing division of labor between the
African Commission and the African Human Rights Court could be
developed to more effectively promote and protect human rights on
the continent. Should, for example, the mandate of the African
Commission be limited primarily to promotional activities, and the
African Human Rights Court exclusively given the protective
function? What relationship should the court have to the African
Commission?
In sum, the paper explores the effect of the African human
rights system in three principal areas. First, it examines the
normative, conceptual, and historical aspects of the African
Charter and its contribution to the human rights corpus. Second,
it looks at the work of the African Commission in the development
of the law of the African Charter, including the problems that it
has faced. Third, it addresses the norms and structure governing
the African Human Rights Court and its potential to fill the
lacunae left by the African Commission and alleviate some of its
weaknesses. The paper also looks at the roles of civil society and
the media in the processes of political reform and democratization,
as these are intrinsically linked to the promotion and protection
of human rights in Africa. Finally, it discusses ways in which the
African human rights system can penetrate the legal and political
cultures of African states to inspire, encourage, and ensure the
internalization of human rights.
II.

The African Charter: A Diagnosis

The African Charter is not an accident of history.
Its
creation by the OAU came at a time of increased scrutiny of states
for their human rights practices, and the ascendancy of human
rights as a legitimate subject of international discourse. For
African states, the rhetoric of human rights had a special
4

resonance for several reasons. First, post-colonial African states
were born out of the anti-colonial human rights struggle, a fight
for political and economic self-determination. Second, black-ruled
African states deployed human rights arguments to demonize and
delegitimize the colonial and minority white-ruled states of
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Apartheid
South Africa. Finally, the atrocities of some of the most brutal
dictatorships the African continent has ever known heightened the
urgency for a regional human rights system. The abominations of
Idi Amin of Uganda, Bokassa of the Central African Empire, and
Nguema of Equitorial Guinea came to be viewed internationally as
paradigmatic of African leadership. As this author has pointed out
elsewhere:
The [African] leadership had to reclaim international
legitimacy and salvage its image. In 1979, shaken by these
perceptions, the OAU Summit in Monrovia, Liberia, appointed a
committee of experts to prepare a draft of an African human
rights charter. It was ironic that virtually none of the men,
the Heads of State and Government, were freely and fairly
elected.
Without exception, they presided over highly
repressive states.
It was virtually the same club of
dictators who adopted the African Charter in Nairobi, Kenya in
1981. Thus was born the African human rights system.11
Normatively, the African Charter is an innovative human rights
document. It substantially departs from the narrow formulations of
other regional and universal human rights instruments. It consists
of 68 articles and is divided into four chapters: Human and
Peoples’ Rights; Duties; Procedure of the Commission; and
Applicable Principles.12 It weaves a tapestry which includes the
three “generations” of rights: civil and political rights;
economic, social, and cultural rights; and group and peoples’
rights.
Its most controversial provisions impose duties on
individual members of African societies. The Charter links the
concepts of human rights, peoples’ rights, and duties on
individuals.
The problems of the African human rights system, which thus
far has been anchored in the African Commission, are well
documented.13 These include the normative weaknesses in the African
11

See Makau wa Mutua, "The African Human Rights System in a
Comparative Perspective," 3 Rev. Afr. Comm. Hum. & Peoples' Rts.
5, 7 (1993).
12

See generally African Charter, supra note 1.

13

For analyses of some normative and structural problems of
5

Charter and the general impotence of its implementing body, the
African Commission.
But the distinctive contributions of the
African Charter to the human rights corpus, which include the
concept of duty and the inclusion of the "three generations" of
rights in one instrument, have also been articulated and applauded
by some scholars.14
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the African Charter concerns
its “clawback” clauses. These clauses permeate the African Charter
and permit African states to restrict basic human rights to the
maximum extent allowed by domestic law.15
This is especially
significant because most domestic laws in Africa date from the
colonial period and are therefore highly repressive and draconian.
The post-colonial state, like its predecessor, impermissibly
restricts most civil and political rights, particularly those
pertaining to political participation, free expression, association
and assembly, movement, and conscience. Ironically, it is these
same rights that the African Charter further erodes.
"Clawback"
clauses,
that
is,
qualifications
or
limitations, permeate the provisions [of the African
Charter] dealing with fundamental freedoms.... These
fundamental civil and political rights are severely
limited by clauses like "except for reasons and
conditions previously laid down by law," "subject to law
and order," "within the law," "abides by the law," "in
the African human rights system, see Richard Gittleman, "The
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis,"
22 Va. J. Int'l L. 667 (1982); Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah,
"The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," in Guide to
International Human Rights Practice 159 (Hurst Hannum, ed.,
1992); Olosula Ojo & Amadu Sessay, "The OAU and Human Rights:
Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond," 8 Hum. Rts. Q. 89 (1994);
Evelyn Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights: Practice and Procedures (1996).
14

Makau wa Mutua, "The Banjul Charter and the African
Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties,"
35 Va. J. Int'l. L. 339 (1995); B. Obinna Okere, "The Protection
of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and
American Systems," 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 141 (1984); Josiah Cobbah,
"African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African
Perspective," 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 309 (1987).
15

See Mutua, "The African System in a Comparative
Perspective," supra note 11, at 7.
6

accordance with the provisions of the law," and other
restrictions justified for the "protection of national
security."16

16

Id., at 7.

7

The African Charter does not have a general derogation clause.
This omission is all the more serious because the Charter in effect
permits states through the "clawback" clauses to suspend, de facto,
many fundamental rights in their municipal laws.17 In any event,
nothing in the Charter prevents African states from denying certain
rights during national "emergencies."18 A revision of the Charter
should excise the offending "clawback" clauses, insert a provision
on non-derogable rights, and another specifying which rights states
can derogate from, when, and under what conditions.
Another controversial question in the Charter concerns its
language of duties.
The African Charter takes the view that
individual rights cannot make sense in a social and political
vacuum, unless they are coupled with duties on individuals. In
other words, the Charter argues that the individual egoist is not
the center of the moral universe. Thus it seeks to balance the
rights of the individual with those of the community and political
society through the imposition of duties on the individual. The
Charter contemplates two types of duties: duties that individuals
owe to other individuals, to the community, and the state, on the
one hand, and duties that the state bears to its subjects, on the
other.
Individuals owe duties to the “family and society, the State
and other legally recognized communities.”19
Furthermore, each
individual has a “duty to respect and consider his fellow beings
without discrimination.”20 Significantly, every individual has a
duty to “preserve the harmonious development of the family and to
work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his
parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need.”21 Among
other matters, these provisions raise questions about the
commitment of the African Charter to women’s rights. There is a
perception and fear that either the African Charter does not
adequately protect or could be used to abuse women's rights.22
The
17

Arthur E. Anthony, "Beyond the Paper Tiger: the Challenge
of a Human Rights Court in Africa," 32 Tex. Int'l L. J. 511, 518
(1997).
18

See Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights 233-34
(1995).
19

Art. 27(1), African Charter, supra note 1.

20

Id., art. 28.

21

Id., art. 29(1).

22

For discussions of the Charter's view on women, see Claude
8

"family" provisions have been thought to condone and support
repressive and retrogressive structures and practices of social and
political ordering.23 This language, which places duties on the
state and individuals to the family, has been interpreted as
entrenching oppressive family structures which marginalize and
exclude women from participation in most spheres outside the home.
others feel that it supports the discriminatory treatment of women
on the basis of gender in marriage, property ownership and
inheritance, and imposes on them unconscionable labor and
reproductive burdens.
In my view, these fears are exaggerated because a progressive
and liberal construction of the Charter seems to leave no room for
the discriminatory treatment of women. The Charter could be read
differently. It can be argued that these are not the practices
that the Charter condones when it requires states to assist
families as the "custodians of morals and traditional values."
Such an interpretation would be a cynical misreading of the
Charter. One interpretation is that the reference here is to those
traditional values which enhanced the dignity of the individual and
emphasized the dignity of motherhood and the importance of the
female as the central link in the reproductive chain.
In many
societies across pre-colonial Africa, women were highly valued as
E. Welch, Jr., "Human Rights and African Women: a Comparison of
Protection under Two Major Treaties," 15 Hum. Rts. Q. 548 (1993);
Florence Butegwa, "Using the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights to Secure Women's Access to Land in Africa," in
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives
495 (Rebecca Cook, ed., 1994); Chaloka Beyani, "Towards a More
Effective Guarantee of Women's Rights in the African Human Rights
System," in Human Rights of Women: National and International
Perspectives 285 (Rebecca Cook, ed., 1994; Joe Oloka-Onyango,
"The Plight of the Larger Half: Human Rights, Gender Violence and
the Legal Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in
Africa," 24 Denver J. Int'l L. & Pol. 349, 371-74 (1996).
23

Article 18, African Charter, supra note 1, refers to the
family as the "natural unit and basis of society" and requires
the state to "assist the family which is the custodian of morals
and traditional values recognized by the community." Elsewhere,
the Charter provides that the individual owes "duties towards his
family and society." Id., art. 27(1). Further, that every
individual has the duty to "preserve the harmonious development
of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the
family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in
case of need." Id., art. 29(1).
9

equals in the process of the regeneration of life.24
The Charter's veneration of African culture has also been
construed as reinforcing gender oppression. The charge here is
that the Charter sees itself as the savior of an African culture is
permanent, static, and unchanging. Viewed this way, the Charter
would freeze in time and protect from reform, radical change, or
repudiation those cultural norms, practices, and institutions which
are harmful to women. Again, taken in its totality as a human
rights document, the Charter does not support such a backward
reading. The Charter seems to guarantee, unambiguously and without
equivocation, the equal rights of women in its gender and equality
provision by requiring states to "eliminate every discrimination"25
against women and to protect women's rights in international human
rights instruments.
24

See Mutua, "The African Cultural Fingerprint," supra note
14, at 371-72.
25

Id., at 372. The Charter states that the "state shall
ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and
also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the
child as stipulated in international declarations and
conventions." Art. 18(3), African Charter, supra note 1. Among
the international conventions applicable here would include the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S.
14 (CEDAW). Normatively, CEDAW is perceived as a very
progressive and forward-looking document.

10

Read in conjunction with other provisions, the Charter seems
to leave no room for discriminatory treatment against women. To
allay these fears, however, and to prevent a conservative human
rights court from ever giving the Charter a discriminatory
interpretation in gender matters, the African Charter should be
supplemented by an optional protocol to fully address women's
rights issues in all their complexity and multiple dimensions.26

26

There already have been calls for a protocol on women's
rights. See Rachel Murray, "Report of the 1996 Sessions of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights," 18 Hum. Rts. L.
16, 19 (1997).

11

The more general critique sees the language of duties as
“little more than the formulation, entrenchment, and legitimation
of state rights and privileges against individuals and peoples”27
These critics of the language of duties, however, only point to a
theoretical danger that states might capitalize on the duty concept
to violate fundamental rights.28 The fear is frequently expressed
that emphasis on duties may lead to the “trumping” of individual
rights, if the two come into conflict.29 In my view, these
criticisms, while understandable, are mistaken.
African states
have not notoriously violated human rights because of their
adherence to the concept of duty.
The disastrous human rights
performance of many African states has been triggered by insecure
regimes whose narrow political classes have no sense of national
interest and will stop at nothing, including murder, to retain
power.
In any case, it is not a plausible argument that
individuals should not owe any duties to the state. In fact, they
do, in tax, criminal, and other laws. A valid criticism of the
language of duties should rather focus on the precise meaning,
content, conditions of compliance, and application of those duties.
More work should be done to clarify the status of the duties in
the Charter, and define their moral and legal dimensions and
implications for enforcement.
III.

The African Commission: Ambiguity and Anemia

The African human rights system is anchored by the African
Charter and implemented by the African Commission. The Commission
is vested largely with promotional functions and an ambiguous
protective function.
Thus far the system lacks a credible
enforcement mechanism. This is hardly surprising because virtually
no African state, with the exceptions of the Gambia, Senegal, and
Botswana could even boast of a nominal democracy in 1981, the year
that the OAU adopted the African Charter.30 Hopes by observers of
the African Commission that it would robustly construe the Charter
to alleviate its weaknesses have largely gone unrealized. With
27

H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Human and Peoples’ Rights: What
Point is Africa Trying to Make?,” in Human Rights and Governance,
supra note 7, at 74, 78-79.
28

Id., at 79.

29

Ronald Cohen, “Endless Teardrops: Prolegomena to the Study
of Human Rights in Africa,” in Human Rights and Governance, supra
note 7, 3, at 15.
30

Mutua, “The African Human Rights System in a Comparative
Perspective,” supra note 11, at 7.
12

respect to specific functions, and to its performance in general,
the African commission has been a disappointment. This section
discusses the architecture of the African Commission and outlines
its basic strengths and weaknesses.
The African Commission was established in 1987, the year after
the African Charter entered into force.31 The eleven members of the
African Commission, the commissioners, are elected by secret ballot
by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government from a list
nominated by states parties to the African Charter.32
The
33
commissioners, who serve in their personal capacity, are elected
for a six-year term and are eligible for re-election.34 Only by the
unanimous agreement of all other commissioners can a member of the
Commission be removed from office, for failure of performance.35

31

Art. 30, African Charter, supra note 1.

32

Id., art. 33.

33

Id., art. 31(2).

34

Id., art. 36.

35

Id., art. 39(2).

13

The basic functions of the African Commission are both
promotional and protective.36 The promotional function, which the
Charter emphasizes, includes research and dissemination of
information through workshops and symposia, the encouragement of
national and local human rights institutions, the formulation of
principles to address legal problems in human rights, and
cooperation
with
African
and
international
human
rights
institutions.37
The Commission is empowered to interpret the
Charter at the request of a state party, the OAU, or any
organization recognized by the OAU.38 In contrast, the provision
relating to the protective function is quite terse. It provides,
without elaborating, only that the Commission shall "[e]nsure the
protection of human and peoples' rights" in the Charter.39

36

Id., art. 45, which sets out the functions of the African
Commission.
37

Id., art. 45(1).

38

Id., art. 45(3). This role, which allows the Commission
to interpret the Charter, is potentially one of the areas that
the commissioners could seize upon to expound and clarify the
Charter.
39

Id., art. 45(2).

14

More concretely, the African Charter charges the Commission
with three principal functions: examining state reports,40
considering communications alleging violations,41 and expounding the
African Charter.42 These functions follow the general script of
other regional as well as universal human rights bodies.43
In
particular, the Commission seems to have drawn substantially from
the procedures and experiences of the UN Human Rights Committee.44
Its Rules of Procedure,45 which provide for process before the
Commission, and the Reporting Guidelines,46 which specify the form
and content of state reports, mirror the lessons of other human
rights bodies.
The Guidelines were supplemented by General
Directives, an unpublished document that was sent to foreign
ministers of states parties in 1990.47 The Directives are just a
40

States parties must submit, every two years, a report on
the legislative and other measures taken to give effect to rights
in the African Charter. Id., art. 62.
41

Id., arts. 47 and 55. The Charter permits two types of
communications: from individuals, NGOs, and groups, on the one
hand, and inter-state communications, on the other. The latter
has never been invoked and will not concern this Article.
42

Id., art. 45(3).

43

See Philip Alston, "Appraising the Human Rights Regime,"
in The United Nations and Human Rights: a Critical Appraisal 1
(Philip Alston, ed., 1992); See generally Thomas Buergenthal,
International Human Rights, supra note 18, at 21-247 (describing
UN Charter-based and treaty-based human rights instruments and
bodies, as well the African Inter-American, European human rights
systems).
44

The Human Rights Committee is the treaty body that
oversees the implementation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
45

The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, adopted on October 6, 1995, reproduced in 18
Hum. Rts. L. J. 154-163 (1997) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
46

See "Guidelines for National Periodic Reports," Second
Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, Annex III, June 1989, AFR/COM/HPR.5(VI).
47

See Astrid Danielsen, The State Reporting Procedure Under
the African Commission 51-2 (1994) [hereinafter State Reporting
15

precis of the Guidelines.

Procedure]; Evelyn A. Ankumah, The African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights: Practice and Procedures 82-3 (1996)
[hereinafter Practice and Procedures of African Commission].

16

The Commission's primary protective function, that of
considering complaints filed by individual victims as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),48 has a large potential which
thus far has not been realized.
First, the Charter places no
restriction as to who may file a communication, an opening that
allows any individual, groups, or NGOs, whether or not they are the
direct victims of the violation complained of, to lodge a
petition.49 However, communications can only be considered by the
Commission if they: indicate their authors, even if the authors
wish to remain anonymous to the public; are not written in a
language that is insulating or disparaging to the state or the OAU;
are not incompatible with the OAU Charter and the African Charter;
are not be based exclusively on media reports; are sent after the
petitioner exhausts local remedies, unless these are obviously
unduly prolonged; are submitted within a reasonable time after
local remedies are exhausted; do not deal with a matter that has
been settled by the states concerned in accordance with
international instruments.50
Although the Charter does not explicitly require it,
communications are considered in private or closed sessions.51 If
the Commission determines that one or more communications "relate
to special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious
or massive violations"52 of human rights, it must draw the attention
of the OAU to such a situation and, presumably, conduct an on-site
48

The African Charter requires that the Commission
"cooperate" with African and international NGOs in its work.
Art. 45(1)(a) and (c), African Charter, supra note 1. Thus the
Commission grants human rights NGOs observer status which allows
their representatives to participate in the public sessions of
the Commission. Rule 75, Rules of Procedure, supra note 45.
49

Art. 55, African Charter, supra note 1.

50

Id., art. 56.

51

Rule 106, Rules of Procedure, supra note 45. The
Commission, which makes its own rules of procedure, may justify
closed sessions for communications under article 59 of the
Charter which provides, in part, that "all measures taken within
the provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential"
until the OAU decides otherwise. But this provision is overbroad
and vague. A literal interpretation of "all measures" would be
absurd. Perhaps the Commission could open at least part, if not
all, of the communications processes to the public.
52

Art. 58(1), African Charter, supra note 1.
17

investigation. In the case of an emergency, the Commission must
inform the Chair of the OAU and request an in-depth study, which
most likely calls for on-site fact-finding.53 This provision had
remained a dead letter until 1995 when the Commission, with the
assistance of the OAU Secretary General, secured the agreement of
Senegal and Togo for field investigations.54 The Commission's power
to conduct such investigations is clearly authorized by the Charter
which empowers it to "resort to any appropriate method of
investigation."55 The commissioners, however, had been reluctant
until recently to claim these powers.
The
Commission's
formula
for
considering
individual
communications closely mirrors that of the UN Human Rights
Committee. In a format similar to that of the HRC, the Commission
arranges its decisions into sections dealing with facts, argument,
admissibility, merits of the case, and the finding. Each of these
sections is scant and thin in both substance and reasoning. Two
examples will suffice.
In Constitutional Rights Project v.
Nigeria,56 a petition challenging a death penalty that was imposed
in violation of due process protections, for example, the
Commission adopted its scripted presentation, "declared" a
violation of the Charter provisions, and "recommended" that Nigeria
free the petitioners.57
In another petition, Civil Liberties
Organization v. Nigeria,58 the Commission found that the government
enacted laws, in violation of the African Charter, to abridge due
process rights and undermine the independence of the judiciary. It
is fair to say, however, that the communications procedure has come
53

Id., art. 58(3).
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“Final Communique of the 17th Ordinary Session of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,” March 12-22,
1995, Lome, Togo, available in
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/achpr17f.html>; see also,
Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of the African Commission, at
47.
55

Art. 46, African Charter, supra note 1.
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Communication 60/91, "Decisions and Reports: African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights," 18 Hum. Rts. L. J. 28
(1997).
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Id.
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Communication 129/94, "Decisions and Reports: African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights," 18 Hum. Rts. L. J. 35,
36 (1997).
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a long way since the early days.
A predictable tradition of
considering petitions is slowly evolving.
It is also clear, however, that the decisions referred to
here, and others before them, are formulaic, and do not reference
jurisprudence from national and international tribunals or fire the
imagination.
They are non-binding and attract little, if any,
attention from governments and the human rights community. The
decisions cannot be published without permission from the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State and Government.59
As explained by two
human rights advocates, the African Commission has revised its
earlier strict interpretation of article 59 which prohibited the
publication of communications:
This changed with the Seventh Activity Report of the
Commission, adopted by the Assembly in June 1994. For
the first time, this report made available information on
the first fifty-two communications decided by the
Commission. The information disclosed includes a summary
of the parties to the communication, the factual
background, and the Commission's summary decision. With
the adoption of the Commission's Eighth and Ninth Annual
Activity Reports, the Commission went a step further and
issued full texts of its final decisions.60
The publication of the Commission's decisions takes place only
after they have been submitted to the OAU Assembly.61 Although the
procedure appears quasi-judicial, the Commission sees its principal
objective as creating a dialogue between the parties, leading to
the amicable settlement of the dispute in question.62 In any case,
59

The Charter provides that all "measures taken within the
provisions of the present Charter shall remain confidential until
such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
shall decide otherwise." See Art. 59(1), African Charter, supra
note 1.
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See Chidi Anselm Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, "The
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: the Development
of its Non-state Communications Procedures," 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 235,
277 (1998) [hereinafter "Development of Non-state
Communications"].
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Id.
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Communications 16/88, 17/88, 18/88 Comite Culturel pour la
Democratie au Benin, Hilaire Badjogoume, El Hadj Boubacare
Diawara v. Benin (it notes, inter alia, that "it is the primary
objective of the Commission in the communications procedure to
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neither the Charter nor the Commission provide for enforceable
remedies or a mechanism for encouraging and tracking state
compliance with decisions.
To many victims, the Commission's
findings are too remote if not virtually meaningless.63
This
overall picture, which is a gloomy one, is by no means universally
shared.
Some see in the communications procedure the gradual
evolution of an effective mechanism:
A comparison of the decisions over the years shows that
while room remains for considerable improvement, the
quality of the Commission's reasoning and decision making
has continued to evolve positively.
In the past two
years, the decisions of the Commission have been more
substantive and elaborate on the issues of law and fact
that are raised in and considered in communications.64
State reporting, which is required by the Charter, follows the
pattern of other human rights bodies.65
The Charter tersely
provides that states shall submit every two years, a "report on the
legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to
the rights and freedoms" enumerated in it.66 The Charter does not
say to what body the reports are to be submitted, whether, how, and
with what goal the reports should be evaluated, and what action
should be taken after such evaluation.
The Commission, not
surprisingly, has filled in these gaps by borrowing heavily from
other treaty bodies.67 Unfortunately, it has mimicked both the good
initiate a dialogue between the parties which will result in an
amicable settlement to the satisfaction of both and which
remedies the prejudice complained of"). See Odinkalu and
Christensen, "The Development of Non-state Communications," supra
note 60, footnote 51, at 244.
63

See African Society of International and Comparative Law,
Report of the 16th Session of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights 62-83 (1996) for more communications by the
Commission. For a very thoughtful analysis of the communications
procedure before the African Commission, see Odinkalu &
Christensen, "The Development of Non-state Communications," supra
note 60.
64

Odinkalu & Christensen, "The Development of Non-state
Communications," supra note 60 at 278.
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Art. 62, African Charter, supra note 1.
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See Felice D. Gaer, "First Fruits: Reporting By States
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and the bad in those bodies.
The Reporting Guidelines, which are detailed, are supposed to
guide states in the preparation of their reports. In particular,
the Guidelines specify both the form and content of reports. Thus
reports must describe in detail the legislative regime as well as
the actual application and protection of specific human rights. In
reality, however, many of the reports submitted thus far have been
woefully inadequate on both counts.68 The initial report of Ghana,
for example, was only a scant five pages while that of Egypt,
although a voluminous fifty pages, only described abstractly some
legislation without commentary on the state of human rights
conditions on the ground.69
Reports are examined in public and state representatives and
the commissioners engage in "constructive dialogue," whose purpose
is to assist and encourage states implement the Charter. After
considering a report, the Commission communicates its comments and
general observations to the state in question.70
Although the
Charter came into force in 1987, the majority of states parties
have not submitted their reports, and the Commission has been
powerless to force compliance.71 The reporting process seems to
have yielded very little so far, as many of the state
representatives have appeared either incompetent or ill-prepared.72
States do not seem to take the reporting seriously and so far the
comments and observations of the Commission on state reports have
not had any discernable effect on states.
But the African Commission has taken some steps which have the
potential to increase its impact on states.
In 1996, the
Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights," 10
Netherlands Hum. Rts. Q. 29 (1992), for an evaluation of the
initial state reporting under the African Charter.
68

See generally, Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of African
Commission, supra note 47, at 79-110.
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Id., at 91-2.
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Rule 106, Rules of Procedure, supra note 45.
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Mohamed Komeja, "The African System of Human and Peoples'
Rights: an Annotated Bibliography," 3 East Afr. J. of Peace &
Hum. Rts. 271, 284-85 (1996).
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Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of the African
Commission, supra note 47, at 99.
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Commission appointed one its members as a Special Rapporteur on
Summary and Extra-judicial Executions is potentially significant if
the office is used to investigate, report, and dialogue with
states.73
Additionally, its country-specific and thematic
resolutions raise its visibility and engage states directly. Such
resolutions have, for example, called on Sudan to allow detainees
access to lawyers and doctors and asked the government to support
negotiations for the settlement of the conflict with the south.74
Another resolution urges African states to respect the rights of
prisoners and to ratify the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.75 These resolutions have
received little publicity and there are no indications that states
take them seriously. However small and tentative, these are steps
in the right direction.
IV.

The African Human Rights Court: Fears and Hopes

Both the European and the inter-American human rights systems
give the impression that a human rights court is an essential, if
an indispensable component of an effective regime for the
protection of human rights.
The reasoning here is that norms
prescribing state conduct are not meaningful unless they are
anchored in functioning and effective institutions. In the case of
the African regional system, this truism merits special attention
because both the norms in the African Charter and the African
Commission itself have been regarded as weak and ineffectual.
Hence the push for a human rights court, an institution that is
intended to correct some of the more glaring failures of the
African system.
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Rachel Murray, "Report of the 1996 Sessions of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights," 18 Hum. Rts. L. J. 16
(1997), supra note 26.
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See Report of the 16 Session of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 63, at 89-90.
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Id., at 95.
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There have been two polar views on the creation of an African
human rights court. One view holds that a human rights court must
be established as soon as possible to salvage the entire system
from its near-total irrelevance and obscurity.76 According to this
view, the deficiencies of the African system -- both normative and
institutional -- are so crippling that only an effective human
rights court can jump-start the process of its redemption. The
court is here seen as a proxy for putting some teeth and bite in
the system. The state is the target that must be restrained.
The other view is gradualist and sees the work of the African
system as primarily promotional and not adjudicative. According to
it, the major problem in Africa is the lack of awareness by the
general populace of its rights and the processes for vindicating
those rights.
Proponents argue that the regional system must
therefore first educate the public by promoting human rights. The
task of protection, which would include a human rights court, is
seen here as less urgent.77 Critics argue that a court might be
paralyzed by the same problems that have beset the African
Commission. They therefore urge that the African Commission be
strengthened instead of dissipating scarce resources to create
another, possibly impotent institution.78
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See Mutua, "The African System in a Comparative
Perspective," supra note 11, at 10; Komeja, "The African System
of Human and Peoples' Rights': an Annotated Bibliography," supra
note 71, at 287.
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See Ankumah, Practice and Procedures of the African
Commission, supra note 47, at 194-95.
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Id., at 195.
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From the mid-to-late 1990s, the gradualist view gave way to
the proponents of a human rights court largely due to the lobbying
efforts of African NGOs and human rights academics. It had become
clear by the mid-1990s, even to pro-establishment figures, that the
African system was a disappointment, if not an embarrassment for
the continent. In 1994, the conservative OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and Government asked its Secretary General to call a meeting
of government experts to "ponder in conjunction with the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights over the means to enhance
the efficiency of the Commission in considering particularly the
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights."79
Events moved speedily in the next several years. In September
1995, a draft document on an African human rights court was
produced by a meeting of experts organized in Cape Town, South
Africa, by the OAU Secretariat in collaboration with the African
Commission and the International Commission of Jurists.80 Later
that month, an OAU meeting of governmental legal experts produced
the Cape Town Draft of the draft protocol for a human rights
court.81
After several rounds of meetings and more drafts, the
Draft Protocol was adopted by the conference of OAU Ministers of
Justice/Attorneys General in December 1997. The OAU Council of
Ministers adopted the Draft Protocol in February 199882 and the OAU
Assembly gave its final blessing in June 1998,83 opening the
Protocol for signature by OAU member states.
79

See Report of Government Experts Meeting, AHG/Res
230(xxx), 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government, Tunis, Tunisia, June 1994, cited in Ibrahim Ali
Badawi El-Sheikh, "Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights: Introductory Note," 9 Afr. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 943, 944 (1997) [hereinafter Draft Protocol to the
African Charter].
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Id., at 944.
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See "Report of Government Experts Meeting on the
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights,"
September 6-12, 1995, Cape Town, South Africa,
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See "International Conference on Human Rights Commission
Opens in Addis," XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 18, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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Salim," XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 18, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
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The consensus among government officials, NGOs, and academics
on the need for a human rights court in the African regional system
has steadily gained momentum. This realization is indicative of
the shortcomings that currently plague the African system. While
the push for the court is not a repudiation of the African
Commission, it is an acknowledgment of its general ineffectiveness.
The hope appears to be that a court will strengthen the regional
system and realize its promise. But that will not happen unless
the court avoids the pitfalls that have trapped the African
Commission.
The presence of other regional human rights courts in the
Americas and Europe has given impetus to the African initiative and
advanced the idea within the modern African state that its conduct
towards its own citizens is no longer an internal, domestic matter.
Even in Asia, where states have been more resistant to the
application and internalization of the human rights corpus -- and
where as of yet there is no regional human rights system -- that
resistance is bound to come under increasing attack by NGOs due to
the establishment of a human rights court in Africa. The regional
supervision of a state's internal conduct towards its nationals is
quickly becoming a reality.
There is little doubt that both the European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have given the
idea of international enforcement concreteness in a way that did
not seem plausible a mere fifty years ago. Africa, a continent
that has been plagued by serious human rights violations since
colonial rule, is now poised to further erode the power of the
sovereign with the establishment of an adjudicatory body, the
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.84 At the adoption of
the Draft Protocol in December 1997, Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU
Secretary General, stated that human rights "is a basic requirement
in any society and a pre-requisite for human progress and
development."85
84
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available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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The African Human Rights Court is an attempt to address some
of the weaknesses of the African system. Its basic function is
protective, and seeks to complement the work of the African
Commission, whose work is basically promotional.86 Although the
African Commission's mandate includes state reporting87 and the
consideration of communications88, a function which is protective,
it is the promotional activities which have been the centerpiece of
its operations.89
But commentators agree that both the state
reporting
and
the
communications
procedures
have
been
disappointing, partly due to the lack of powers and the absence of
textual clarity. Can the African Human Rights Court cure these
problems?
The court would be composed of eleven judges elected in their
individual capacity by the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and
Government from among "jurists of high moral character and of
recognized practical, judicial or academic competence and
experience in the field of human and peoples' rights."90 Judges
would serve for a six-year term and be eligible for re-election
only once.91
It is a shortcoming that all judges, except the
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The Protocol realizes this contrast -- in essence the
weaknesses and the incompleteness of the African Commission -when its states in its preamble that the African Human Rights
Court will "complement and reinforce the functions of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights." Protocol, preamble,
supra note 3. It adds, further, that the African Human Rights
Court shall "complement the protective mandate of the African
Commission." Id., Article 2.
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President of the court, serve on a part-time basis.92
Although
their independence is formally guaranteed and they are protected by
the immunities of diplomats under international law, part-time
service undermines the integrity and independence of the court.93 A
Judge can only be removed by the unanimous decision of all the
other judges of the court.94 A Judge who is a national of a state
party to a case must be recused to avoid bias.95 The court appoints
its own registrar and registry staff.96
The court's jurisdiction is not circumscribed or limited to
cases or disputes that arise out of the African Charter.97 The
Protocol provides that actions could be brought before it on the
basis of any instrument, including international human rights
treaties, which are ratified by the state party in question.98
Furthermore, the court can apply as sources of law any relevant
human rights instrument ratified by the state, in addition to the
African Charter.99
The court is empowered to decide if it has
jurisdiction in the event of a dispute.100 The court can exercise
both contentious and conciliatory jurisdiction.101 It has advisory
jurisdiction through which it may issue advisory opinions on "any
legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human
rights instruments."102 Such an opinion can be requested by a wide
variety of entities including a member state of the OAU, the OAU or
any of its organs, or even an African NGO, provided it is
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"amicable settlement" of disputes.
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Id., art.4(1).
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recognized by the OAU.103
One serious shortcoming of the African Human Rights Court
relates to the limitation of access placed by the Protocol on
individuals and NGOs.
The court has two types of access, one
automatic, the other optional.
The African Commission, states
parties, and African intergovernmental organizations enjoy
unfettered or "automatic" access to the court once a state ratifies
the Protocol.104 In stark contrast, however, individuals and NGOs
cannot bring a suit against a state unless two conditions are met.
First, the court has discretion to grant or deny such access.105
Secondly, at the time of ratification of the Draft Protocol or
thereafter the state must have made a declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the court to hear such cases.106
While this limitation may have been necessary to get states on
board,107 it is nevertheless disappointing and a terrible blow to
the standing and reputation of the court in the eyes of most
Africans.
After all, it is individuals and NGOs, and not the
African Commission, regional intergovernmental organizations, or
states parties, who would be the primary beneficiaries and users of
the court. The court is not an institution for the protection of
the rights of states or OAU organs.
A human rights court is
primarily a forum for protecting citizens against the state and
other governmental agencies. This limitation will render the court
virtually meaningless unless it is interpreted broadly and
liberally.
The court is technically independent of the African Commission
although it may request the Commission's opinion with respect to
103

Id.

104
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relevant Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with observer
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Id., at 5(3), 34(6).
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Ambassador Badawi, a member of the African Commission and
its former chair, alludes to this when he notes that the
"question of allowing NGOs and individuals to submit cases to the
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consideration of the Draft Protocol." See Badawi El-Sheikh,
"Draft Protocol of the African Charter," supra note 79.
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the admissibility of a case brought by an individual or an NGO.108
In ruling on admissibility of a case, the court must also take into
account the requirements that communications must meet under the
African Charter.109
Presumably, the court should not hear cases
which do not meet these criteria.
The court may also consider
cases or transfer them to the African Commission, where it feels
that the matter requires an amicable settlement, not adversarial
adjudication.110
It is vital that the court determines its own rules of
procedure111, a fact which should enhance its independence.
Proceedings before the court would generally be conducted in public
and parties would be entitled to legal representation of their own
choice.112
Witnesses or parties to a case "shall enjoy all
protection and facilities, in accordance with international law"113
in connection with their appearance before the court. This would
shield witnesses from various pressures and intimidation and
facilitate their ability to more fully and freely participate in
proceedings.
The court is given wide powers in conducting proceedings. It
seems to have discretionary jurisdiction, and need not take all the
cases that come before it. This should allow the court to avoid
over-load and to hear only those cases which have the potential to
advance human rights protection in a meaningful way. The court may
hear submissions from all parties, including oral, written, and
expert testimony.114 States are required to assist the court, and
provide facilities for the efficient handling of cases.115 Once the
108

Art. 6(1), Protocol, supra note 3.

109
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court finds a violation, it may order remedies, including "fair
compensation or reparation."116 In cases of "extreme gravity and
urgency," the court may order provisional remedies, such as an
injunction, to avoid irreparable harm to victims, actual or
potential.117
The court's judgments, which are final and without appeal,118
are binding on states.119
In its annual report to the OAU, the
court specifically lists states which have not complied with its
judgements.120 This is a "shaming" tactic that marks the violator.
The OAU Council of Ministers is required to monitor the execution
of the judgement on behalf of the OAU Assembly. Presumably the OAU
Assembly can take additional measures to force compliance, such as
passing resolutions urging states to respect the court's
judgements. Alternatively, the OAU Chairman could be empowered to
write to delinquent states asking that they honor the court's
judgements.
Critics and supporters alike have argued that it makes little
sense to create an institution that duplicates the weaknesses of
the African Commission. In the context of the OAU, an organization
with scarce financial resources and limited moral clarity and
vision, the establishment of a new body should be approached
116

Id., art.27(1).
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Id., art.27(2).
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execution." (emphasis added).
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somberly. A human rights court will only be useful if it genuinely
seeks to correct the shortcomings of the African system and
provides victims of human rights violations with a real and
accessible forum to vindicate their basic rights. What the OAU and
the African regional system do not need is yet another remote and
opaque bureaucracy, one that promises little and delivers nothing.
If that were the case, then it would make more sense to expend
additional resources and energy to address the problems of the
African Commission and defer the establishment of a court for
another day. Several important questions will have to addressed if
the human rights court is to become a significant player in human
rights in Africa.
The second set of problems that face the human rights court
are institutional. These concerns are external to the court and
are compounded by matters internal to it, such as the tenure of
judges and its effect on the independence of the court and the
limitation of access to the court to individuals and NGOs. It is
absolutely critical that the court is, and be perceived as,
separate and independent from the African Commission to avoid
burdening it with the severe image problems and the anemia
associated with its older sibling. This is possible if there is a
clear-cut division of labor between the African Human Rights Court
and the African Commission. That is not currently the case. A
court was not contemplated by the drafters of the African Charter
and as a result the African Commission was vested with both
promotional and protective functions.
One clear protective
function is the individual complaint procedure which makes the
Commission "court-like" because of its quasi-judicial character.
The African Charter should be revised to remove protective
functions from the African Commission and to vest them exclusively
with the African Human Rights Court. The African Commission should
only be charged with promotional functions, the most basic of which
should be state reporting and dialogue with NGOs and government
institutions in member states to encourage promotion, advocacy, and
the incorporation of human rights norms into state policies and
domestic legislation.121 This unambiguous demarcation of areas of
competence should alleviate the problem of hierarchy or
"competition" between the two institutions, and may enhance
cooperation and mutual reinforcement. Importantly, it should avoid
tainting one body with the baggage of the other. Thus the African
Commission would clearly be the "political" body while the court
121
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would alone be the judicial or "legal" organ of the African human
rights system.
The court has broad powers and may, presumably at its
discretion, exercise contentious, conciliatory, or advisory
jurisdiction. The Protocol does not seem to impose a mandatory
jurisdiction on the court, that is, require it to hear every
admissible case. While certain entities are entitled to submit
cases to it, the court has discretion under the admissibility
clause to consider or transfer cases to the African Commission.122
This discretion is essential if one considers the purposes of
adjudication that the court ought to carve out for itself to become
effective, relevant, and visible in the struggle against the
culture of impunity and human rights violations.
There are three basic purposes which are associated with
national and international adjudicatory bodies.
These are:
vindicating the rule of law by providing justice in an individual
case;
protecting
rights
through
deterrence
and
behavior
modification; and expounding legal instruments and making law
through elucidation and interpretation.123 To fulfill its promise,
the African Human Rights Court will have to reflect carefully on
these roles and decide where it has the potential to make a
meaningful contribution.
The African Human Rights Court should not be viewed as a forum
for offering individual justice to victims of human rights
violations. While such a goal is certainly noble, it is by all
means impossible. The court can act neither as a forum of first
instance nor as the mandatory court of appeal for all cases. Cast
in this role, the court would be paralyzed by a torrential
caseload. Statistics from other fora tell why the court should not
burdened with a mandatory jurisdiction. The most poignant example
is that of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body that oversees
the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.124
Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
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individuals can petition the HRC for the vindication of their
rights.125 The HRC's use of a mandatory jurisdiction to consider
all admissible cases has created a back-log of at least three
years.126
The possible ratification of the Optional Protocol by
states with large populations such as China, India, USA, and
Indonesia -- together with the growing familiarity by victims with
the procedure -- can only underscore the complete inability of the
HRC to respond to all individual cases.
The African Human Rights Court need not make the mistake of
the HRC. It will not survive if it adopts a mandatory jurisdiction
because the volume of cases is bound to be enormous. Instead the
court should only hear those cases that have the potential to
expound on the African Charter and make law that would guide
African states in developing legal and political cultures that
respect human rights.
In other words, the court should not be
concerned with individual cases where it looks, as it were,
backwards, attempting to correct or punish an historical wrong to
an individual. Rather, the court should look forward and create a
body of law with precedential value and an interpretation of the
substantive law of the African Charter and other key universal
human rights documents to direct states. Here, the court would
protect rights by judgements which by their nature deter states
from future misconduct by modifying their behavior. Individual
justice would be a coincidence in the few cases the court would
hear. Moreover, individual courts in OAU member states should look
to the African Human Rights Court for direction in the development
and application of human rights law.
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Finally, the African Human Rights Court would benefit
tremendously from the experiences of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as well
national fora such as the Constitutional Court of South Africa
which have taken the lead in developing human rights jurisprudence.
The court should closely examine the factors that have made these
institutions more effective.
Some authors have identified a
checklist of such factors which the African Human Rights Court
ought to contemplate.127 Helfer and Slaughter have organized them
into three clusters: factors that states parties to the treaty
creating the court control (such as tribunal's composition, its
investigative powers, and the legal status of its decisions);
factors that the tribunal itself controls (such as quality of legal
reasoning and degrees of autonomy from political interests); and
factors beyond the control of the tribunal and the states parties
(such as the cultural identities of states and the nature of abuses
monitored by the tribunals).128
This checklist can be particularly useful if judges are
independent and motivated by the drive to make the African Human
Rights Court the central institution in the development of a legal
culture based on the rule of law. Over the past decade, there has
been a general movement in Africa towards more accountable and open
governments.
The court comes in an environment of increased
awareness about the proper limits of governmental conduct. For the
first time since decolonization, states seem to be more willing to
either foster or allow the creation of institutions of public
accountability. The checklist by Helfer and Slaughter would appear
to be a useful one under these circumstances, considering that the
three clusters make a reasonable template for an emergent regional
court. Ultimately, effective supranational adjudication will not
be possible in Africa unless the OAU system and individual member
states treat, and expect, the African Human Rights Court to lead
them in transforming the dismal legacy of state despotism on the
continent.
5:

Civil Society, Human Rights, and Political Reform
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The establishment of the regional human rights system in
Africa in the mid-to-late 1980s coincided with the onset of what
has been termed African Renaissance.129
After the first three
decades of independence had failed primarily because of bad
government, African peoples across the continent were determined in
the late 1980s to end years of despotic, unaccountable, single
party or military governance. After all, many economic and social
indicators had dipped to an all-time low. It was in this climate
that Africa started witnessing historic demands for political
liberalization since decolonization some three decades earlier.
Throughout the continent, millions of citizens started to demand a
government sanctioned by the free will of the governed.
This
“second African liberation” sought to reverse decades of
authoritarian one-party rule, unspeakable human rights abuses, and
economic mismanagement.
A determined cadre of middle-class
moderates, mostly notably lawyers, journalists,130 and human rights
advocates were relentlessly pressing governments throughout Africa
to open up the political process to a competitive electoral
process. The rallying cry for these reformers was, and remains,
human rights and its inseparable twin, the rule of law.
These continental convulsions started in 1989 in Cotonou,
Benin, then a centrally planned, autocratic one-party state. Almost
in tandem with anti-communist reformers in Eastern/Central Europe,
hundreds of citizens took to the streets of Cotonou demanding that
long-standing dictator Mathieu Kerekou resign immediately and hand
over power to an elected government. At first, Kerekou responded
to the protests by ordering the beatings and arrests of the
demonstrators.
He relented, however, as the number of mass
protests mounted. Within months, President Kerekou was forced to
agree to a national constitutional conference with his political
opponents, civic leaders, and religious groups. In March 1991, he
was resoundingly defeated in the country’s first democratic
election since independence in 1960. The newly elected, democratic
government of Nicephore Soglo won international acclaim for its
impressive stewardship of the emergent democracy.
The new
government restored judicial independence and the freedom of the
press. For the first in the country’s history, the legislature and
civic and local organizations became vehicles for popular
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political participation.131
Since the turn toward democracy, more respect for human
rights, and a free press in Benin, many African governments have
agreed to open political competition, some after protracted
national debates and false starts and fits.
But typically,
virtually all one-party or military regimes in Africa have been
forced over the past decade to agree to new constitutional
frameworks
that
guarantee
open
political
competition
and
fundamental human rights. In 1994 apartheid in South Africa was
defeated in no small measure to the relentless campaigns of the
internal civil society and political groups working in concert with
the international community.
In May 1994, Kamuzu Banda
relinquished power in Malawi after the first open election in the
country’s history. 132 This story has been replayed in most states
in Africa. In effect, political reformers have uprooted one
dictator after another. Today only a few states in Africa formally
reject political democracy as a system of government.
The apparent spontaneity and unpredictability of the
democratic upheaval throughout Africa shocked policy analysts,
particularly in the West, where it has been believed for a long
time that Africa was not ready for political democracy. But to
most Africans the events of the last decade were long overdue.
Over the years, attempts by Africans to overthrow repressive
regimes have been quickly reversed or fallen short. But a number
of factors have combined to produce the beginnings of encouraging,
albeit limited successes. The basic impetus for the change has
been the inability of the African state to meet the basic economic
needs of the population. At independence, Africans expected their
governments to reduce widespread poverty, ignorance, and disease.
But the very nature of the new regimes militated against sustained
development. Carved haphazardly by European powers, most of them
did not cohere as states or make sense as political and economic
entities. The export-oriented, one-product economies imposed by
colonial overlords did not create an auspicious setting for
developmental take-off. The global marketplace, with its throwaway prices for primary commodities, would not be kind to these new
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entrants.
These problems were significantly compounded by the political
and moral bankruptcy of the new elites of politicians and
bureaucrats.
They inherited and maintained, almost intact, the
repressive and exploitative colonial structures. They faithfully
carried out ill-advised economic programs and projects of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
They consumed
conspicuously the national resources.
To maintain their
stranglehold on power, they depleted the balance of resources,
including international assistance, to equip security forces.
Dissent and independent political activity were brutally suppressed
by persecution of opponents, real and perceived.
Under these
regimes, most indices of well-being plummeted sharply, giving rise
to universal discontent among the citizenry.
These desperate
conditions led to coups and counter-coups, civil wars, and other
social and economic catastrophes. With the end of the cold war,
and the inability or the unwillingness of the United States and the
former Soviet Union to prop up their client states, these miserable
conditions left many governments exposed and without external
support. Hence, the success of the pro-democracy reformers.
Not surprisingly, African reformers from Benin in 1989 to
Nigeria in 1999 have based their campaigns to capture state power
on civil and political rights, the language of liberalism. They
argue that it is from these freedoms that a democratic ethos and a
culture of tolerance will emerge. Human rights groups, women’s
groups, environmentalists, bar associations, private electronic and
print media, and farmer’s lobby groups have mushroomed throughout
Africa in the past decade. Political parties have become one of the
principal avenues for mediating state power. Yet human rights
problems abound everywhere on the continent.
Despite the
establishment of the regional human rights system and the creation
of national human rights institutions in places as diverse as
Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda to mention a few, the continent
remains a euphemism for human suffering. In the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda,
the Republic of Congo, and Angola, human rights conditions remain
bleak and grim. There have been painful reversals in some states,
such as Burundi and the Republic of Congo where democratic gains
were made earlier in the decade.
Elsewhere, the deepening and
consolidation of democracy is becoming a serious challenge. One
thing is clear: the emergent paper-thin democracies of Africa will
fail or revert to dictatorship unless a confluence of domestic and
international factors combine to lift these societies over the
threshold.
Emergent democracies must create constitutional and legal
regimes that permit the growth of a vibrant and open civil society
37

with a democratic ethos, respect for opposing views, and a free
press.
They must allow the whole gamut of civil and political
rights. Formally, this can be effected at once. Repressive laws,
undemocratic constitutional and state structures, and suffocating
government regulations can be repealed at once upon the ascendancy
of popularly elected legislatures.
But that alone will not
suffice. Due to centuries of abuse and deprivation, it has been
difficult, and in many cases impossible, to develop and sustain
practices that enhance and internalize concepts of civic
responsibility, an essential ingredient in a functioning democracy.
Emergent democracies must allow the growth of the private, nongovernmental sector and instill in public servants and law
enforcement officials an appreciation for the proper limits of
state action.
They must also contain and punish, without
exception, the unconstitutional and corrupt practices of state
officials. In this respect, the anti-corruption and reform efforts
of Olusegun Obasanjo, the democratically elected president of
Nigeria, will be instructive and telling about the future of
democracy in Africa.133
The most serious threat to democracy, civil society, and
reform remains, however, in the impoverished economies of African
states. Democracy will not take root in Africa if the majority of
its population continue to live in abject poverty.
Africans
support democracy because they expect it to reverse decades of
corruption, mismanagement, and economic hardship. Only innovative
domestic economic policies coupled with a reform of the
international economic arrangements to take into account the
difficult conditions of African states can create the conditions
necessary for human development.
VI:

Conclusion

Africa has been traumatized by human rights violations of
historic proportions over the last five centuries.
The recent
chapter in that long history of abuses is still being authored
under the direction of the post-colonial state. But the peoples of
Africa, like peoples elsewhere, have never stopped struggling for
better conditions of life, and especially for more enlightened and
accountable political societies. The popular repudiation of oneparty and undemocratic states over the past decade has once again
given hope that the predatory impulses of the post-colonial state
might be arrested. Within states, non-governmental organizations
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have multiplied during that period and governments are being been
forced to revise policies and laws that are offensive to basic
human rights.
At the continental level, NGOs and human rights
advocates have demanded that the African Commission become part of
this movement towards change.
This is the lense through which Africans now view the African
human rights system. While it is felt by many Africans that the
idea of the African Commission was a step in the direction, there
are serious misgivings that it has been largely ineffectual.
Further, that a regional human rights system worth its name need
strong institutions to anchor its norms. The African Human Rights
Court is an attempt to fulfill that promise. However, the court
promises to be a disappointment unless states parties revisit the
African Charter and strengthen many of its substantive provisions.
Moreover, the court will not meet the expectations of Africans if
the OAU does not provide it with material and moral support to
allow it to function as the independent and significant institution
that it ought to be. Finally, of course, the initial integrity and
vitality of the court will rest with those who will be privileged
to serve as its first bench. Unless these conditions are met, the
African Human Rights Court is condemned to remain a two-legged
stool, a lame institution unable to fulfill its promise as a seat
from which human rights can be advanced. In that case, the court
will have failed to redeem the troubled African regional system.
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